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Abstract
Across Europe, far-right parties have made significant electoral gains in recent years.
Their anti-immigration stance is considered one of the main factors behind their suc-
cess. Using data from Finland, this paper studies the effect of immigration on voting
for the far-right Finns Party on a local level. Exploiting a convenient setup for a shift-
share instrument, I find that a 1 percentage point increase in the share of foreign
citizens in a municipality decreases the Finns Party’s vote share by 3.4 percentage
points. Placebo tests using pre-period data confirm this effect is not driven by per-
sistent trends at the municipality level. The far-right votes lost to immigration are
captured by the two pro-immigration parties. Turning to potential mechanisms, immi-
gration is found to increase voter turnout, potentially activating local pro-immigration
voters. Moreover, the negative effect is only present in municipalities with high ini-
tial exposure to immigrants, consistent with the intergroup contact theory. Finally, I
also provide some evidence for the welfare-state channel as a plausible mechanism
behind the main result.
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1 Introduction
The popularity of far-right (sometimes also referred to as populist radical right)1
parties across Europe has been rising rapidly in recent years. The latest political
developments in Europe—such as the UK’s exit from the European Union—suggest
that the surge of the far-right could have significant negative economic and polit-
ical consequences for the entire continent. The rise of the far-right appears to be
driven—in large part—by immigration. Since the early 1990s, Europe has expe-
rienced significant migration flows. First was the East to West migration from
post-communist countries that began with the fall of the Soviet Union, and accel-
erated after the EU enlargements in the 2000s. Recent years saw a large inflow of
asylum seekers from Asia and Africa fueled by a number of armed conflicts. Both of
these immigration shocks likely kindled anti-immigrant sentiments across the con-
tinent, contributing to an unprecedented wave of electoral success among far-right
parties.
This paper studies the effect of immigration on voting for the far-right on a
local (municipality) level. This micro effect is facilitated through the personal con-
tact between natives and immigrants as well as the perceived impact of foreign
in-migration on local communities. By contrast, the macro effect of national immi-
grant inflows refers to the salience of migration in the national social and political
discourse.2 The micro-level impact of immigrants on natives’ voting choices is a pri-
ori ambiguous3 and thus requires an empirical examination. This study focuses on
Finland, a country that had a single far-right party (the Finns Party) for nearly 25
years (1995–2017) but was long considered immune to the surge of the far-right seen
in other European countries (Ellinas 2010; Goodwin 2008; Ignazi 2003). The period
of study is 2006 to 2015. These years are characterized by both the historically largest
inflow of foreign citizens into Finland (Koivukangas 2003) and a remarkable rise in
the Finns Party’s popularity. Indeed, there is a positive correlation between immigra-
tion and far-right voting on the national level (see Section 3 for more details). The
analysis employs a novel panel dataset that spans 7 election years and 297 munici-
palities (all of mainland Finland). All types of national elections (i.e., parliamentary,
presidential, and European parliamentary) are considered.
The sudden and unprecedented increase in immigration into Finland that fol-
lowed the 2004 EU enlargement also provides an excellent setup for identification.
1The term far-right (or far right) is used in Betz (2008), Davies (2008), Ellinas (2010), Goodwin (2008),
and Roxburgh (2002). The label populist radical right is preferred by Arter (2010) and Mudde (2007).
Still, others use the terms right-wing populist (Norocel 2016; Swank and Betz 2002) or even extreme right
(Carter 2005; Ignazi 2003). These different labels generally refer to the same party family.
2As proposed by Hopkins (2010) in his politicized places hypothesis, the two channels likely interact with
each other. For example, in communities that experience a rapid demographic change during the period of
salient national immigration rhetoric, immigrants can quickly become targets of local political hostility.
3Group conflict theory (Sherif et al. 1961) and ethnic competition theory (Olzak 1992) suggest a positive
effect, while the intergroup contact theory (Allport 1954) predicts the opposite. Economic theories of labor
market competition and the welfare-state are less clear-cut; the predictions depend on the precise charac-
teristics of immigrants and natives (Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Facchini and Mayda 2012; Dustmann and
Preston 2007).
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The 2003 distributions of immigrants by continent of citizenship can be used to
construct a “shift-share” instrument (Altonji and Card 1991; Orrenius and Zavodny
2015) to identify the effect of immigration on far-right voting. One thing that makes
this instrument particularly convincing in this case is the change in immigrant com-
position that followed the 2004 enlargement. While the 1990s and early 2000s
were characterized primarily by an influx of Ingrian Finns from the former Soviet
Union and asylum seekers from countries such as Somalia and former Yugoslavia
(Koivukangas 2003), the 2004 and the subsequent EU enlargements brought in
mostly economic migrants from Central and Eastern Europe. This minimizes the
concern that IV results could be driven by persistent trends in anti-immigrant or
pro-immigrant attitudes across municipalities.
Using the shift-share instrument, I find an economically meaningful and statisti-
cally significant negative effect of municipal in-migration of foreigners on the Finns
Party’s vote share. The IV coefficient from the preferred specification suggests that
1 percentage point increase in the share of foreign citizens in a municipality (68%
of the mean) decreases the Finns Party’s vote share by about 3.35 percentage points
(28% of the mean). Placebo tests using pre-period data confirm the IV estimate is not
driven by persistent trends at the municipality level. To further validate the IV design,
I re-estimate the main specification using a shift-share instrument constructed with
1991 immigrant distributions.4 The resulting coefficient remains negative, statisti-
cally significant at 5%, and slightly larger in magnitude than the original estimate.
Additional robustness checks such as the first-difference estimation, the inclusion of
lagged-immigrant share, the exclusion of potential outliers, and the estimation with
larger geographical units confirm the main result.
Considering the effect of immigration on voting for other parties, I find that
the strongly pro-immigration Green League and Swedish People’s Party gain votes.
Indeed, their positive coefficients roughly add up to the negative estimate for the
Finns Party. These positive effects are also relatively large; a 1 percentage point
increase in the foreign share increases the Green League’s vote share by 23% and the
Swedish People’s Party’s vote share by 57% with respect to the sample means.
Exploring the potential mechanisms behind my main finding, I first show that
local foreign in-migration increases voter turnout (3% with respect to mean), poten-
tially activating a larger pro-immigration base. Interestingly, the share of protest
votes remains unaffected by immigrant inflows. In addition, heterogeneity analysis
reveals that the negative effect of immigration on the Finns Party’s vote share is only
present in places with large initial exposure to immigrants. This finding provides
some evidence in favor of Allport (1954)’s intergroup contact theory which suggests
that a meaningful contact between natives and immigrants can effectively ameliorate
natives’ anti-immigrant attitudes. Finally, I also find some evidence consistent with
the welfare-state channel. In particular, I show that immigration increases municipal
per capita personal income tax revenue, while per capita spending on social services,
health care services, and education remain unaffected (Facchini and Mayda 2012;
2009; Dustmann and Preston 2007).
4Before any major immigrant inflow into Finland occurred.
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My analysis contributes to the growing economics literature on the effects of
immigration on voting for the far-right and other anti-immigrant parties in Europe
(described in more detail in Section 2).5 Most studies find a positive effect (Halla
et al. 2017; Barone et al. 2016; Becker and Fetzer 2016; Edo et al. 2019; Gerdes
and Wadensjö 2008; Harmon 2018; Mendez and Cutillas 2014; Otto and Steinhardt
2014; Brunner and Kuhn 2018), while the negative relationship has only been docu-
mented in Steinmayr (2018), and to some extent also in Dustmann et al. (2019) and
Levi et al. (2020).
This study is the first to show that an inflow of economic migrants can reduce
support for the far-right across all types of national elections. By contrast, both
Steinmayr (2018) and Dustmann et al. (2019) consider the exposure to refugees
through refugee allocation schemes. In addition, Steinmayr (2018) evaluates the
impact of a specific and relatively short-term event—the European refugee crisis—
and considers only the extensive margin of immigration. This paper, on the other
hand, focuses on the intensive margin and the study period spans 10 years and
involves three types of national elections. Regarding Dustmann et al. (2019),
the negative effect is present only in a limited subsample analysis of the 5%
most urban Danish municipalities (i.e., 26 observations). By contrast, I find no
effect heterogeneity with respect to initial population size—the negative effect
is present in municipalities both above and below the median initial population
size.
Second, this paper examines a broad set of electoral outcomes in a parlia-
mentary democratic system, which before the emergence of the Finns Party was
characterized by basic electoral stability and the implosion of the party system.
The former refers to low volatility of electoral gains and losses while the lat-
ter describes a scenario in which all major parties become center parties capable
of forming a coalition government with one another (Arter 2008). In this politi-
cal setting, uniquely positioned to face the threat of a right-wing populist party, I
consider the impact of immigration on voting for other parties and voter turnout,
as well as the protest vote. A few previous studies have considered the impact of
immigration on voter turnout. Barone et al. (2016) find a negative effect, while
Steinmayr (2018) finds no effect. Dustmann et al. (2019) find a positive effect
but only in municipal elections, whereas I find an increase in turnout in the con-
text of national elections. As far as the protest vote is concerned, the only other
paper that considers it is Barone et al. (2016). While they find an increase in the
share of invalid ballots in response to immigrant inflow, I find no effect on the
protest vote.
Third, Finland provides a unique setting in a number of other dimensions as
well. Before the 2004 EU enlargement, Finland was a country with minimal immi-
grant inflow and a very low far-right popularity. Even after 2004, both the stock
and the inflow of migrants remained relatively low compared to other EU countries
5A number of correlational studies in political science have also considered the relationship between
immigration and voting for European far-right parties. Results are mixed: positive association is found in
Golder (2003), Swank and Betz (2002), and Anderson (1996); while Dülmer and Klein (2005), Messina
(2007), and Kitschelt and McGann (1995) estimate a negative relationship.
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(Eurostat 2020). In addition, the majority of immigrants have been from Europe,
with a large number of economic migrants arriving from Central and Eastern Europe
following the 2006 and 2007 labor market openings. Last but not least, Finland is
also interesting as it is characterized by an extensive welfare state, highly educated
and aging population, compressed wage distribution, and high union density, all of
which have likely played an important role in shaping natives’ attitudes towards
immigration (Sarvimäki 2011; Koivukangas 2003).
Fourth, this paper is one of only a handful of studies providing evidence for
the welfare-state channel as a possible mechanism through which immigration
affects far-right voting. This is particularly appealing given that Finland is a coun-
try with a generous welfare system (managed primarily by municipalities), and
thus, native concerns about immigrant “benefit tourism” are especially relevant
in this context. Previous papers have focused mostly on labor market and com-
positional amenities (Halla et al. 2017; Barone et al. 2016; Becker and Fetzer
2016), cultural diversity (Barone et al. 2016), the intergroup contact theory (Stein-
mayr 2018), and other non-economic aspects (Otto and Steinhardt 2014). Otto
and Steinhardt (2014) do consider welfare channel as well, but they provide only
indirect evidence.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 surveys the findings in the previ-
ous literature. Section 3 discusses the background. In Section 4, I describe the data
and identification strategy. Results are presented in Section 5. Section 6 discusses
potential mechanisms. Section 7 concludes.
2 Related literature
Far-right parties across Europe have strong anti-immigration rhetoric at the core of
their political platforms. This feature stems from their ideology of ethno-nationalism
(or nativism), defined by Betz (2008) to be a “strong belief that different societies
and cultures adopt entirely different values, which are neither inferior, nor supe-
rior, but essentially incompatible with each other.” This ideology makes far-right
parties both nationalistic and xenophobic, and in recent years also Islamophobic
(Mudde 2007). In a recent report, Esipova et al. (2015) suggest that Europeans are
the most negative in the world towards immigration, with 52% preferring lower
immigration levels in their countries. Thus, to better understand the recent rise in
the far-right in Europe, it is instrumental to study the role immigration plays in
this process.
A growing number of recent papers in economics have explored this issue empir-
ically, each focusing on a case of a specific European country. Halla et al. (2017)
use a shift-share instrument to study the effect of immigrant inflow on voting for
the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ). They find a positive effect which is driven
by voters’ fear of the adverse impact of immigration on local labor markets and
compositional amenities. In an Italian setting, Barone et al. (2016) show that for-
eign municipal in-migration increases vote share of the anti-immigrant center-right
coalition (which includes the far-right Northern League). Proposed mechanisms in
this study include cultural diversity, competition in the labor market and for public
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services, and political competition. Studies have also found a positive effect in Ger-
many (Otto and Steinhardt 2014), UK (Becker and Fetzer 2016), France (Edo et al.
2019), Denmark (Gerdes and Wadensjö 2008; Harmon 2018), Spain (Mendez and
Cutillas 2014), and Switzerland (Brunner and Kuhn 2018).
In contrast with the previous studies, Dustmann et al. (2019) use a quasi-random
allocation of refugees into municipalities to study the impact of immigration on vot-
ing in Denmark. Documenting a large effect heterogeneity, the authors find that in all
but the most urban municipalities, refugee inflow increases vote share of both anti-
immigrant and center-right parties, while the vote share of center-left parties declines.
However, in most urban municipalities, refugee allocation actually decreases sup-
port for anti-immigrant parties. The negative effect has also been documented in
Steinmayr (2018) who suggests that hosting refugees in Austrian municipalities
dampened the overall positive trend in support for the Freedom Party (FPÖ), consis-
tent with Allport (1954)’s intergroup contact theory. Interestingly, he also finds that
a brief exposure to a large number of refugees passing through the municipalities
actually increased FPÖ’s vote share. Similarly, Levi et al. (2020), considering the
dynamics of migration and the voting for Britain’s far-right UKIP, show that immi-
grants increase far-right support only in the short-run, while in the long-run, it is
the opposite.
The relationship between immigration and far-right popularity is undeniably tied
to the underlying attitudes of natives towards immigrants and immigration policy.
Two economic channels have been identified as potential determinants of these sen-
timents. In line with the labor market hypothesis, Mayda (2006) finds that skilled
individuals are more (less) likely to be pro-immigration in countries where the rela-
tive skill composition (i.e., ratio of skilled to unskilled labor) of natives to immigrants
is high (low). Scheve and Slaughter (2001) draw a similar conclusion suggesting that
less-skilled workers are significantly more likely to prefer limitation of immigrant
inflows into the country.
The second economic mechanism is the so-called welfare-state channel. Consis-
tent with its predictions, Facchini and Mayda (2012, 2009) find that in countries
where immigrants are unskilled, pro-immigration preferences are negatively cor-
related with income and positively correlated with skill. These relationships are
reversed in economies characterized by skilled migration. In a similar analysis, Dust-
mann and Preston (2007) find welfare concerns to be a more important determinant
of natives’ attitudes towards immigrants than labor market concerns.
A number of studies have also emphasized the importance of non-economic
mechanisms such as crime, xenophobia, and the cultural or national identities
(Nunziata 2015; O’Rourke and Sinnott 2006; Mayda 2006), as well as the signifi-
cance of social cohesion in general (Zimmermann 2019). In a cross-country analysis
of OECD countries, Bauer et al. (2000) show that natives in countries receiving
mostly refugees care primarily about social issues such as crime, while those in coun-
tries with a lot of economic migrants are more concerned about their labor market
outcomes. Finally, immigrants can also affect natives’ non-pecuniary working con-
ditions (Giuntella et al. 2019) and general life satisfaction (Akay et al. 2014, 2017).
Both of these factors likely play an important role in determining natives’ sentiments
as well.
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Fig. 1 Finns Party’s vote share (all of Finland), 1996–2015. Notes - Data comes from Statistics Finland’s
StatFin database
3 Background
3.1 The Finns Party
The Finns Party (previously known as the True Finns; Finnish: Perussuomalaiset, PS)
was the single far-right party in Finland since its establishment in 1995 until it split
into two in mid-2017. In 1997, its first chairman, Raimo Vistbacka, was replaced by
Timo Soini who led the party until 2017. Following a series of unsuccessful elections,
the party made a breakthrough into the mainstream Finnish politics during the 2009
European election when it gained 9.79% of total votes (Fig. 1). In the 2015 parlia-
mentary election, the Finns Party finished as a runner-up and for the first time formed
a coalition government with the Centre Party and the National Coalition Party. Soini
became the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Deputy Prime Minister of Finland.
In June 2017, following the election of new a chairman, Jussi Halla-aho, the party
split into two: the Blue Reform remained in the coalition government while the Finns
Party went into opposition.6 My study period (2006–2015) ends 2 years before the
split occurred. The following description applies to the period of the Finns Party’s
uniform existence.
According to Norocel (2016), some Finnish scholars argue that the party is
not necessarily a clear-cut case of far-right due to its strong left-leaning political
agenda on economic matters. However, as Westinen (2014) points out, there is lit-
tle doubt that the Finns Party is a nationalist-populist movement which combines
ethno-nationalism and anti-elitism, typical features of far-right parties in Europe
6The Finns Party (official website): https://www.perussuomalaiset.fi/
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(Mudde 2007).7 This view is shared by Arter (2010) who claims that the notion of
true Finnishness (suomalaisuus) is the pre-eminent concept of the Finns Party’s ide-
ology. Finally, Yla-Anttila and Yla-Anttila (2015) underline the points mentioned
above suggesting that the Finns Party’s ideology combines a populist defense of a
common man against corrupt elites, a defense of welfare state against market-led
policies, and a nationalist defense of the sovereignty and unity of the Finnish people
against immigration and federalist tendencies of the European Union. These points
clearly suggest that the Finns Party can be considered a member of the European
far-right family.
The party has a strong anti-immigration platform, as described in the following
statement from its 2015 parliamentary election campaign pamphlet:
“Immigration will change, irreversibly, the host country’s population profile,
disrupt social cohesion, overburden public services and economic resources,
lead to the formation of ghettoes, promote religious radicalism and its conse-
quences, and foster ethnic conflicts. [...] It can still be possible to avoid the
immigration disasters of Sweden, France and the United Kingdom but it will
require a determined policy and clear legislation.” (source: The Finns Party’s
Immigration Policy, 2015)
Moreover, according to the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) data, which
describes policy and ideological positions of national political parties in the EU,
the Finns Party has been the sole anti-immigrant party in Finland since 2006. As
Table 1 suggests, throughout the study period, the party was consistently in favor
of a tough immigration policy while strongly opposing multiculturalism (advo-
cating for immigrant assimilation instead). In addition, immigration policy was a
very salient topic in Finns Party’s manifestos (Table 1, column 4). Table 1 also
reveals that none of the other main parties was anti-immigrant throughout the study
period.
3.2 Other political parties in Finland
There are seven main political parties in Finland (other than the Finns Party): Social
Democratic Party (SDP), Centre Party (Kesk), National Coalition Party (Kok), Green
League (Vihr), Swedish People’s Party (SFP/RKP), Christian Democrats (KD), and
Left Alliance (vas.). The first three (SDP, Kesk, Kok), each founded over a cen-
tury ago, have traditionally been the strongest parties regularly placing on top of the
electoral lists.8 SDP is a moderate center-left social democratic party, while Kesk
7According to Mudde (2007), European far-right parties share three common ideological features: ethno-
nationalism, populism, and authoritarianism. Populism considers society to be ultimately separated into
two groups, “the pure people” and “the corrupt elite,” and argues that politics above all should be the
expression of the will of the people. Authoritarianism is defined as a disposition to glorify, to be sub-
servient to and remain uncritical towards authoritative figures of the ingroup (hence, the reason why
far-right parties are typically led by authoritative leaders such as Le Pen, Wilders, and Soini).
8In recent years, before the 2017 split, the Finns Party briefly joined this “elite” club.
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Table 1 Immigration position and salience - main political parties in Finland (2006-2014)
Party Election year Immig. policy position Immig. policy salience Multiculturalism
Finns Party 2006 8.11 8.22 7.89
2010 9.1 8.9 9.1
2014 9 - 9.38
Vihr 2006 1.56 5.89 2.67
2010 2 7.1 2.1
2014 1.38 - 1.25
SFP/RKP 2006 2 5.78 2.89
2010 2.2 6.7 2.4
2014 2.75 - 2.13
Kok 2006 5 4.33 5.56
2010 5.8 4.5 5.5
2014 5.13 - 5.25
Kesk 2006 5.67 3.89 5.67
2010 5.8 4.6 6.5
2014 5.63 - 6.25
SDP 2006 4.78 3.78 5.11
2010 5.3 4.3 5.6
2014 4.13 - 4
KD 2006 5.11 4.67 6
2010 6 5.56 6.89
2014 6.14 - 7.29
vas. 2006 3.11 4.56 4
2010 3.7 4.9 4.3
2014 2.88 - 2.25
Immig. policy position, position on immigration policy (0–10; 0, “strongly opposes tough policy”; 10,
“strongly favors tough policy”). Immig. policy salience, importance/salience of immigration policy (0–10;
0, “not important at all”; 10, “extremely important”). Multiculturalism, position on integration of immi-
grants and asylum seekers (0–10; 0, “strongly favors multiculturalism”; 10, “strongly favors assimilation”).
Vihr, Green League; SFP/RKP, Swedish People’s Party; Kok, National Coalition Party; Kesk, Centre Party;
SDP, Social Democratic Party; KD, Christian Democrats. Data comes from the 1999–2014 Chapel Hill
Expert Survey (CHES) trend file
is centrist and Kok center-right, both of them having a liberal-conservative ideol-
ogy (source: European Election Database). Although none of the seven parties was
anti-immigrant during the study period, two of them—Green League and Swedish
People’s Party—did have strong pro-immigration platforms. Indeed, as Table 1
shows, between 2006 and 2014, Vihr and SFP/RKP had low scores on both Immi-
gration policy position and Multiculturalism, indicating an opposition to tough
immigration policy as well as a preference for multiculturalism. Moreover, as with
the Finns Party, Vihr and SFP/RKP both considered immigration policy to be a very
important topic in political discourse (Table 1, column 4).
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3.3 National elections in Finland
3.3.1 Parliamentary elections
Parliament of the Republic of Finland (Eduskunta) is unicameral, composed of
200 members directly elected by people for a 4-year term. Seats in the parlia-
ment are distributed among 13 electoral districts (or constituencies) in proportion to
their populations 6 months prior to the election. This means that each constituency
effectively holds its own parliamentary election. Candidates may be nominated
by political parties or constituency associations (founded by at least 100 enfran-
chised persons from the same constituency). MPs are then chosen based on the
number of votes they receive as well as the number of votes received by their
party (or constituency association). Elections take place on the third Sunday in
April, and voting can take place either in advance or on election day.9 Eligi-
ble to vote are all Finnish citizens aged 18 or above regardless of their domicile
(Ministry of Justice 2010).
3.3.2 Presidential elections
The President of the Republic of Finland is elected in a direct vote for a 6-year
term. Each presidential candidate must be a native-born Finnish citizen, and no
individual can stay in the office for more than 2 consecutive terms. Candidates
are nominated by parties that have currently at least 1 seat in the parliament, or
by constituency associations established by at least 20,000 people entitled to vote.
The election proceeds in one or two rounds, the second round being essentially
a runoff between the two most successful candidates from the first round. The
second round takes place only if no candidate gains more than 50% of all votes
in round 1. Each presidential election is held on the fourth Sunday of January
(round 1), with the second round taking place two weeks later. Voting eligibil-
ity is the same as in parliamentary elections; advance voting is also allowed
(Ministry of Justice 2010).
3.3.3 European elections
As a member of the European Union, Finland can elect Members of the European
Parliament (MEPs) who serve 5-year terms. The number of Finnish MEPs is deter-
mined by the ratio of the Finnish population to the population of the whole EU.10
Candidates for the European Parliament are nominated by political parties or con-
stituency associations (established by at least 2,000 people), and voting proceeds as
in the parliamentary elections. In contrast with parliamentary elections though, each
9An exception was the 2007 parliamentary election which was held on March 18 due to the 100th
anniversary of the first Finnish parliamentary election (March 15–16, 1907).
10Finland has had 13 MEPs since 2009. Before that, there were 14 (1999–2009) and 16 MEPs (1996–
1999), respectively.
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Fig. 2 Annual inflow of foreign citizens into Finland, 1990–2015. Notes - Data comes from Statistics
Finland’s StatFin database. Total population is measured at the beginning of the calendar year
candidate for an MEP enters the European election for the entire country. The election
day is generally the second Sunday in June (Ministry of Justice 2010).11
3.4 Immigration into Finland
Historically, Finland has been characterized by emigration (Sarvimäki 2011). From
the end of World War II until the early 1970s, the country attracted very few
migrants. Although immigration increased in the 1970s, throughout the 1970s and
1980s some 85% of immigrants were return migrants coming mostly from Sweden.
A small number of refugees from Vietnam and Chile also arrived during this period
(Triandafyllidou and Gropas 2008). It was not until the 1990s that Finland experi-
enced a major inflow of foreign citizens (Koivukangas 2003). As Fig. 2 suggests,
the first significant wave of foreigners began arriving in 1991 and was caused by the
dissolution of the Soviet Union and the civil wars in the (former) Yugoslavia and
Somalia. Ingrian Finns from Russia and Estonia and asylum seekers from Yugoslavia
and Somalia made up the largest foreign immigrant groups in Finland throughout the
1990s (Koivukangas 2003). Due (in part) to a restrictive refugee policy,12 the frac-
tion of the population with foreign citizenship remained below 2% until 2003, one of
the lowest in the EU during this period (Fig. 3; Koivukanga 2003).
11Although there are exceptions: the 1996 election was held on October 20 while the 2014 election took
place on May 25.
12The annual refugee quota was 500 throughout the 1990s. In 2001, the quota was raised by the Finnish
Parliament to 750. In recent years, due to an ongoing civil war in Syria, Finland has admitted more than a
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Fig. 3 Share of foreign citizens in Finland, 1991–2015. Notes - Data comes from Statistics Finland’s
StatFin database. Share of foreign citizens is measured at the beginning of the calendar year
As Fig. 2 depicts, the migration flow of foreign nationals into Finland increased
dramatically in the late 2000s. In May 2004, the European Union accepted ten new
member states (EU8 plus Malta and Cyprus).13 This historic enlargement was fol-
lowed by the accession of Bulgaria and Romania (January 2007), and later Croatia
(July 2013). Due to fears of mass migration of workers induced by the large economic
disparities between East and West, EU member states agreed upon the so-called
transitional restrictions. These restrictions allowed each old member to postpone the
opening of its labor market to the new members for a period of up to 7 years. Finland
opened its labor market to Malta and Cyprus immediately in 2004 but chose to wait
until May 2006 for all EU8 countries. For Bulgaria, Romania, and Croatia, the work-
related immigration restrictions were lifted immediately upon their EU accession in
January 2007 and July 2013, respectively (Pytliková 2014). Thus, while the 2004
enlargement already induced some inflow of foreigners (such as students) from Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe, the two main immigration-inducing shocks were the 2006
and 2007 labor market openings. The period 2006 onwards is indeed the time of the
largest immigrant inflow in Finnish history, and therefore, it is the focus of this study
(see Fig. 2; Koivukangas 2003). As Fig. 4 confirms, the majority of incoming for-
eigners during this time were European citizens, primarily economic migrants from
the new EU member states in Central and Eastern Europe (Fig. 5). Although, interest-
ingly, the post-2006 period also saw a sizable increase in the inflow of non-European
migrants (see Figures A.1 and A.2 in Appendix C, available in the GLO Discussion
Paper, No. 540).
13EU8 refers to the following countries: Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, Slovakia, Estonia,
Latvia, and Lithuania.



























Fig. 4 Immigration into Finland (by group), 1991–2015. Notes - Data comes from Statistics Finland’s
StatFin database. Immigrants are divided according to their country of citizenship
In the last couple of years, Finland has also witnessed a sizable inflow of asylum
seekers from Northern Africa and Middle East. However, since the last national elec-
tion in Finland took place in mid-2015, my study period ends at the onset of the recent
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EU8 + Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia EU15
Rest of Europe
Fig. 5 European immigration into Finland (by group), 1991–2015. Notes - Data comes from Statistics
Finland’s StatFin database. Immigrants are divided according to their country of citizenship
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4 Data and empirical strategy
4.1 Data
The empirical analysis uses a municipality-by-election year panel dataset with 7 elec-
tion years (2006–2015) and 297 municipalities. The following elections are used in
the study: 2007, 2011, 2015 parliamentary elections; 2006, 2012 presidential elec-
tions (first round only); 2009, 2014 European elections. The Finns Party’s candidate
in both presidential elections was its leader, Timo Soini, who was eliminated in the
first round in both cases. Municipal elections are not used in the analysis since any
foreigner with a permanent residency in a given municipality is eligible to vote in
that municipality’s local election.14 A similar concern arises with European elections
since non-Finnish EU citizens with a municipality of residence in Finland are eligible
to vote for Finnish MEPs (Ministry of Justice 2010). Figure 6 plots the distribution
of the share of votes cast by non-Finnish EU citizens across all municipalities in the
2014 European election. The histogram shows that almost 35% of municipalities had
no foreigners casting a vote.15 Moreover, almost all municipalities are located below
the 0.5% mark meaning the proportion of foreign votes cast in most cases was negli-
gible. Histogram generated for the 2009 European election (available upon request)
shows distribution that is even more skewed to the right. Nevertheless, as an addi-
tional robustness check, I exclude the 2009 and 2014 European elections from the
analysis.
Spatially, the analysis extends to all of mainland Finland; excluded are only the
Åland Islands (16 municipalities). Åland is a Swedish-speaking autonomous region
that belongs to Finland and is located between continental Finland and Sweden.
Its population makes up roughly 0.5% of the country’s total population (sources:
Statistics Finland, Statistics and Research Åland). Although the region has its own
parliament, the people of Åland also elect one member of the Finnish Parliament in
every national parliamentary election. However, the Islands have their own political
parties and so voting for the Finns Party is not an option. Moreover, since the region
is not only linguistically but also culturally Swedish, it would not be appropriate to
include these municipalities in the same analysis with the rest of the country.16
In the past 12 years, the number of municipalities in Finland has been steadily
shrinking to 313 (as of January 1, 2016). Municipality changes were mostly merges
of two (or more) municipalities together. Information on all changes was provided
by The Association of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities as well as Statis-
tics Finland. The panel dataset is constructed using the 2016 municipality format.
The dependent variable in the analysis is the Finns Party’s share of valid votes.
The independent variable of interest is the share of foreign citizens in a munici-
pality. The analysis also includes the following municipality-specific time-varying
controls that likely affect voting for the Finns Party: log of total population, popu-
14Data on the number of foreign votes cast in local elections (overall and for individual parties) is not
available.
15102 out of 297 municipalities (34.3%) had exactly 0 foreign votes in 2014 European election.
16The Office of Åland website: http://www.aland.ax/en/facts-about-aland/.
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Fig. 6 Distribution of share of votes by other EU citizens, 2014 European election. Notes - Data comes
from Statistics Finland’s StatFin database
lation density (per km2), share of females in adult population, share of population
(aged 25–64) with tertiary education, share of aged 65+ in adult population, ratio of
skilled to unskilled labor (in population aged 20–64), total crime rate (per 100,000
population), unemployment rate, and median household disposable income (per con-
sumption unit). More details about the covariates are reported in Appendix A. All
data comes from Statistics Finland’s public-use StatFin database. Table 2 provides
the descriptive statistics for all variables.
A potential pitfall with using election vote share is naturalization, a process
through which most foreigners without family ties to Finnish citizens obtain Finnish
citizenship. Since naturalized Finns are de facto foreigners, a significant number of
votes from these individuals will contaminate the dependent variable. However, as
Gozdecka (2013) points out, Finnish citizenship has been a rather exclusive good
aimed at foreign nationals who have put substantial effort into finding employ-
ment in Finland, learning Finnish language, and integrating themselves into Finnish
society. This is indeed reflected in Finland’s naturalization rate,17 which has had
a fairly stable trend in the past 25 years (Fig. 7). During the 2006-2015 period,
the naturalization rate had a declining trend (albeit with a considerable year-to-year
variation). On average, the yearly rate was 3.6% during this time. Thus, although
the problem with naturalization cannot be completely ruled out, the evidence pre-
sented here suggests that the number of naturalized Finns is not high enough to alter
the results.
17Defined as the number of citizenships granted divided by the total foreign-born population.
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics
Mean Standard Min Max
deviation
Finns Party’s vote share 0.120 0.076 0.001 0.534
Share of foreign citizens (% of population in 1991) 0.014 0.014 0.000 0.142
Population 17,895.13 44,697.37 763 612,664
Population density (per km2) 56.93 222.74 0.17 3,051.04
Share of females in adult population 0.499 0.014 0.438 0.543
Share of population (25–64) with tertiary education 0.272 0.075 0.118 0.694
Share of aged 65+ in adult population 0.264 0.056 0.113 0.460
Ratio of skilled to unskilled labor 3.44 1.10 1.35 8.93
Total crime rate (per 100,000) 5,633.45 3,130.57 1,071.26 63,930.13
Unemployment rate 0.119 0.043 0.028 0.288
Median household disposable income (EUR) 20,572.79 2,538.48 14,765 36,799
Number of observations: 2,079. Data comes from Statistics Finland’s StatFin database
4.2 Baseline fixed effects specification
The baseline empirical specification is the fixed effects model of the form:
Far-righti,t = α + β Foreigni,t + X′i,t γ + λt + μi + εi,t (1)
where Far-righti,t is the Finns Party’s share of valid votes in municipality i and elec-
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Fig. 7 Naturalization rate in Finland, 1991-2015. Notes - Data comes from Statistics Finland’s StatFin
database
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year. The independent variable of interest, Foreigni,t =
(




share of foreign citizens (as percentage of population in 2003) in municipality i and
election year t . The foreign share is measured on the first day of the calendar year.
As commonly done in immigration literature, I standardize the number of foreign-
ers by the population in the base year of the IV (discussed later). Population at t
is not used since it is likely endogenous to immigration. Xi,t represents the set of
municipality-specific time-varying controls mentioned earlier. Since covariate val-
ues at time t are potential mechanisms through which immigration affects far-right
vote share, I include them as 1 calendar year lags instead. The main specification
also includes a full set of municipality fixed effects (μi) to capture municipality-
specific time-invariant determinants of Finns Party’s vote share, and election year
fixed effects (λt ) to control for year-specific shocks that equally affect all municipal-
ities (e.g., 2009 Eurozone sovereign debt crisis). Finally, the preferred specification
also includes region-by-election year fixed effects to control for local business cycles
and other year-specific shocks that affect equally all municipalities within the same
administrative region. The fixed effects specification has been used extensively in the
immigration literature (e.g., Orrenius and Zavodny (2015), Giuntella et al. (2019),
Barone et al. (2016), Giuntella et al. (2018)). However, as a robustness check, I esti-
mate an alternative first-difference model, following the strategy proposed by Sá
(2014).
The OLS estimation of Eq. 1 will likely suffer from endogeneity issues arising
from sorting among both natives and immigrants. First, immigrants may decide to
avoid anti-immigrant far-right strongholds. This has been shown in a recent paper
by Slotwinski and Stutzer (2019) to be the case in Switzerland after its anti-minaret
referendum in 2009. Following the specification suggested in Halla et al. (2017),
I directly test for this reverse causality by regressing the change in the 2006–2015
immigrant share on a number of initial conditions including the 2003 Finns Party
vote share. Results of this OLS estimation are presented in Table 3. Reassuringly, the
municipalities with significant initial far-right support do not appear to be receiving
less migrants after the 2004 EU enlargement. However, even if immigrants do not
sort based on the pre-existing anti-immigrant sentiments, they might decide to leave
municipalities which turn hostile towards them. This reverse causality would bias
OLS downwards.
The second potential source of endogeneity is immigrant-induced native sorting.
More specifically, an inflow of immigrants into a municipality may trigger an out-
flow of natives who face direct labor market competition (Borjas 2006). Also, as
immigrants move in, natives who are anti-immigrant for non-economic reasons may
decide to leave. A disproportionate number of natives who leave might therefore con-
sist of far-right voters, in which case the OLS estimate will be biased downwards.
On the other hand, pro-immigrant natives who derive positive utility from living in
a diverse community could decide to move in together with the immigrants. Such
inflow of natives who arguably do not support the Finns Party would bias the OLS
estimate downwards as well.
Finally, as Borjas et al. (1996) suggest, immigrants may also cluster in areas with
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in a downward bias as well. On the other hand, as Halla et al. (2017) point out, if a
community is hit by a negative economic shock which depresses housing prices, it
may actually attract immigrants. If this shock also shifts voters’ preferences to the far
right, the resulting bias will be positive.
4.3 Identification
To identify the causal effect of interest, I employ an instrumental variable approach
using a “shift-share” IV (Altonji and Card 1991). This instrument is based on an
observation that immigrants tend to cluster in ethnic enclaves set up decades ago.
My analysis uses a version of the instrument proposed by Orrenius and Zavodny
(2015). More specifically, I first determine the distribution of foreigners by continent
of citizenship across mainland Finnish municipalities in 2003 (base year). Then, for
each of the election years in 2006–2015, the total national18 counts of foreign citizens





t ∗ Share in ij2003
Populationi,2003
(2)
where ̂Foreigni,t is the predicted share of foreign citizens in municipality i in election
year t , Foreignjt is the number of foreign citizens from continent j in mainland Fin-
land in election year t , and Share in i j2003 is the share of foreigners with continent of
citizenship j in municipality i in 2003. As the summation indicates, immigrants are
divided into 6 groups based on their citizenship (each group roughly corresponds to a
continent): EU27 Europe,19 non-EU Europe, Africa, Asia, America (North, Central,
and South America combined), and Oceania. Figures A.3 and A.4 (in Appendix C
available in the GLO Discussion Paper, No. 540) show the 2003 spatial distribution
for each of these groups.
For the instrument to be valid, the predicted share of foreigners can affect the
Finns Party vote share only through its direct effect on the actual share of foreign-
ers. 2003 is chosen as the base year because it precedes the 2004 EU enlargement
and the subsequent inflow of Central and Eastern European migrants. Moreover, it
marks a change in the composition of immigrants coming into Finland (from asy-
lum seekers to economic migrants). Thus, conditional on covariates and fixed effects,
the 2003 distributions are unlikely to be correlated with unobservable predictors
of anti-immigrant attitudes and Finns Party popularity after 2006. As an additional
robustness check, the IV analysis is re-estimated using 1991 as the base year (15 years
before my study period). Since immigration of foreigners into Finland was minimal
before 1991, the results from this alternative IV estimation serve as further evidence
validating the exclusion restriction of the original instrument.
The IV estimates could still be invalid if there is a persistence of municipality-
specific trends in pro-immigrant and/or anti-immigrant attitudes. The inclusion of the
18The term “national” refers to mainland Finland.
19This definition includes all 27 current members of the European Union (excluding Finland).
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region-by-election year fixed effects mitigates this concern. In addition, I conduct
placebo tests with pre-period election data (1995–2003) to directly test for such per-
sistence. Finally, if natives “vote with their feet” and if this native sorting after 2006
is correlated with the baseline immigrant distributions, IV estimate will be biased. I
therefore re-estimate Eq. 1 using the same IV approach, but larger geographical units
(administrative subregions and regions). A significant change in the IV coefficient
will indicate the presence of such bias. In addition, I conduct a direct test of native
sorting using an approach proposed in Peri and Sparber (2011).
5 Results
5.1 Main results
Before showing the regression estimates, it is useful to first consider visual evidence.
In Fig. 8, I map the spatial distribution of Finns Party’s average 2006–2015 vote share
as well as the distribution of the average 2006–2015 immigrant share. The figure
Fig. 8 Average Finns Party vote share vs. share of foreign citizens (2006–2015). Notes - Data comes
from Statistics Finland’s StatFin database. 2016 municipality-level ArcGIS shapefile was provided by
The Association of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities. Both maps depict all of mainland Finland
(297 municipalities in total) and employ a Transverse Mercator projection. The 16 Swedish-speaking
municipalities of Åland Islands are excluded
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suggests a negative relationship between immigration and far-right voting on a local
level. In particular, the coastal municipalities in southern Finland (around the cities
of Helsinki, Espoo, and Turku) have large immigrant shares but low support for the
Finns Party. Similar pattern holds for a number of municipalities on the west-central
coast (around the cities of Oulu, Kokkola, and Vaasa) as well as some municipalities
in the northernmost region of Lapland. On the other hand, many of the landlocked
municipalities in south-central Finland display a substantial support for the far-right
party but a low concentration of immigrants.
Table 4 presents main regression results from the estimation of Eq. 1 using
OLS (cols. 1–3) and IV (cols. 4–6) methods. The coefficient of interest is neg-
ative and remains significant at 5% in all specifications. The OLS estimates are
fairly small in magnitude (5–11% with respect to the sample mean). The IV coef-
ficients are roughly 2–5 times larger than OLS depending on the specification.
First-stage results (Table 12) confirm the instrument is strong; the Kleibergen-Paap
rk Wald F-statistic (22.77) exceeds the Stock-Yogo 10% maximum IV size critical
value even in the full specification (col. 3). The IV coefficient from the preferred
specification (Table 4, col. 6) suggests that a 1 percentage point increase in the
share of foreigners in a municipality (68% of the mean) decreases Finns Party’s
electoral support by about 3.35 percentage points (28% of the mean). Put differ-
ently, 1 standard deviation increase in the foreign share decreases Finns Party’s vote
Table 4 Main results
(OLS) (OLS) (OLS) (IV) (IV) (IV)
Finns Party Finns Party Finns Party Finns Party Finns Party Finns Party
Share of foreign citizens −0.659* −1.284*** −0.656* −1.464*** −4.103*** −3.351***
(% of population in 2003) (0.300) (0.341) (0.303) (0.373) (0.809) (0.936)
Municipality/election Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
year FE
Time-varying controls (lag) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE × election Yes Yes
year FE
Observations 2,079 2,079 2,079 2,079 2,079 2,079
Adjusted R-squared 0.832 0.836 0.880 - - -
Mean of dep. variable 12% 12% 12% 12% 12% 12%
Std. dev. of dep. variable 7.56% 7.56% 7.56% 7.56% 7.56% 7.56%
Kleibergen-Paap rk - - - 62.32 34.53 22.77
Wald F-stat.
Finns Party, Finns Party’s share of valid votes. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at municipality
level. Based on slope estimate in the last column, 1 std. dev. increase in share of foreign citizens decreases
FP vote share by 4.36 p.p. (58% of its std. deviation). Time-varying controls: log of population, population
density, share of females, share of tertiary educated, share of aged 65+, ratio of skilled to unskilled labor,
total crime rate, unemployment rate, median household income. Data comes from Statistics Finland’s
StatFin database. *** Significant at the 0.1% level. ** Significant at the 1% level. * Significant at the 5%
level. † Significant at the 10% level.
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share by 0.58 standard deviations. The large magnitude implies an economically
important effect.
For comparison, Steinmayr (2018) suggests that hosting refugees in a municipality
decreases far-right FPÖ’s vote share by 4.42 percentage points. This magnitude is
(in absolute terms) very similar to mine, although the two estimates are clearly not
directly comparable since I consider the intensive margin of immigration. Dustmann
et al. (2019) in their paper find that in the top 5% of urban Danish municipalities, 1
percentage point increase in the refugee share between electoral cycles decreases the
vote share for anti-immigration parties by 3.79 percentage points in parliamentary
elections. Given these parties’ overall vote share of 7.6%, this is indeed a similarly
large effect. Lastly, Barone et al. (2016), finding a positive effect in Italy, show that
1 standard deviation increase in foreign share increases the vote share of the anti-
immigrant center-right coalition (including the far-right Northern League) by 0.33 standard
deviations. In relative terms, this effect is roughly half the size of my estimate.
The difference between my OLS and IV estimates is likely caused by attenuation
bias arising from measurement error in the main independent variable. As Angrist and
Pischke (2008) explain, if the measurement error is random, the OLS coefficient will
be biased towards zero. An instrumental variable approach can correct for this bias. In
the context of immigration, Aydemir and Borjas (2011) suggest that the attenuation
bias arising from even a small measurement error can be significant if the model
includes a large number of fixed effects. That is indeed the case here. Results in
Sections 5.5 and 6.1 lend further credibility to the idea of attenuation bias. Using the
same IV to estimate the effect of immigration on other electoral outcomes (e.g., voter
turnout, other parties’ vote shares), I find that in every specification, the OLS estimate
is attenuated towards zero, regardless of the coefficient sign (see Sections 5.5 and 6.1
for more details).
To explore the likely source of this attenuation bias, I consider more closely the
procedure implemented by Statistics Finland to account for the foreign citizens living
in a municipality in a given year. First, foreign citizens are counted in only if they
intend to live in Finland for at least 12 months upon arrival into the country. Thus,
some students, workers, and other visitors are excluded, even though their presence
might affect natives’ voting preferences. Another important group that is not included
in the measurement of the foreign population is asylum seekers whose applications
are pending. On the other hand, foreign citizens with permanent residency in Finland
are counted in the data even if they are temporarily living abroad, in which case my
main independent variable will overcount the “true” immigrant population (Statistics
Finland 2016).
5.2 Alternative first-difference specification
As the main robustness check, I estimate an alternative, first-difference version of
Eq. 1 which uses net immigrant flow as the main independent variable. The specifi-
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where Far-righti,t is the level change in Finns Party’s vote share in municipality
i between elections at t − 1 and t .20 Foreign-borni,t is the change in the num-
ber of foreign citizens in municipality i between t − 1 and t . To be consistent with
Eq. 1, I standardize the change in the number of immigrants by population in the base
year (2003). Covariates are included in lagged levels (Xi,t−1) since the level changes
between t − 1 and t are endogenous to immigration. Estimating a first-difference
model means that the municipality-specific fixed effects are differenced out. Thus,
σi captures municipality-specific trends in Finns Party’s vote share. Finally, λt cap-
tures national trends in factors that affect far-right vote share, such as the trend in
Finland’s GDP per capita. To deal with endogeneity in β (the coefficient of interest),
I construct the following instrument which uses the same distributions of immigrants
by continent of citizenship in 2003 as the instrument in my main analysis:
∑6
j=1 δi,j,2003 ∗ Foreign-bornj,t
Populationi,2003
(4)
where δi,j,2003 is the share of immigrants with continent of citizenship j living in
municipality i in 2003. Foreign-bornj,t is the change in the overall number of for-
eign citizens from continent j in mainland Finland between t − 1 and t . Estimation
results are presented in Table 5. In columns (4)–(6), I replicate the analysis with pop-
ulation at t − 1 (instead of the population in 2003) in the denominator. Although the
interpretation of β in the first-difference case differs from that in my main specifica-
tion, reassuringly, all estimates in Table 5 remain negative and statistically significant
at 5%.
5.3 Robustness checks, placebo tests, and shift-share critique
I conduct a battery of additional robustness checks to test the sensitivity of the IV
estimates. Results are reported in Appendix B. Table 13 confirms that eliminating
some of the potentially “bad” controls (such as unemployment rate or median house-
hold income) does not significantly alter the results. In addition, using 1991 (instead
of 2003) as the base year for the instrument slightly increases the magnitude of the
IV estimates, although the standard errors increase as well due to a weaker first stage
(Table 14). The IV estimates are also robust to the exclusion of European elections
(Table 15) as well as the exclusion of 9 largest municipalities as potential outliers
(Table 16). Although the full specification (column 3) in both Table 14 and Table 16
exhibit a weak instrument problem, the weak-IV robust Anderson-Rubin chi-sq. p-
value confirms the 5% level significance of both IV estimates. Finally, I re-estimate
the model separately for each election type (parliamentary, presidential, European).
The coefficient on immigrant share is negative, statistically significant, and with
comparable magnitudes across the three specifications suggesting that the negative
effect is not limited to a specific type of national election (Table 17).
20For those election years that are more than one calendar year apart, t − 1 refers to the preceding election
year and not the preceding calendar year.
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Table 5 Alternative first-difference specification (IV results)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 Finns  Finns  Finns  Finns  Finns  Finns
Party Party Party Party Party Party
Net immigrant flow −4.063* −4.144* −4.566*
(% of population in 2003) (1.975) (1.978) (2.059)
Net immigrant flow −4.736* −4.780* −5.269*
(% of population in t−1) (2.193) (2.196) (2.279)
Population density (1-year lag) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Female share (1-year lag) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Share aged 65+ (1-year lag) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Share tertiary educated Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(1-year lag)
Log of population (1-year lag) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Skill ratio (1-year lag) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Total crime rate (1-year lag) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Unemployment rate Yes Yes
(1-year lag)
Median household income Yes Yes
(1-year lag)
Observations 1,782 1,782 1,782 1,782 1,782 1,782
Mean of dep. variable 2.55% 2.55% 2.55% 2.55% 2.55% 2.55%
Std. dev. of dep. variable 7.52% 7.52% 7.52% 7.52% 7.52% 7.52%
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-stat. 53.61 53.71 53.52 45.69 45.82 45.88
 Finns Party, level change in Finns Party’s share of valid votes between elections at t − 1 at t . Net
immigrant flow, change in number of foreign citizens between election year t − 1 and t . Standard errors
in parentheses, clustered at municipality level. All regressions also control for municipality-specific time
trends (municipality dummies), national trends (election year dummies). Data comes from Statistics Fin-
land’s StatFin database. *** Significant at the 0.1% level. ** Significant at the 1% level. * Significant at
the 5% level. † Significant at the 10% level.
A natural concern with a shift-share instrument is that persistent trends at the
municipality level may be correlated both with the IV and the outcome of interest. To
partially address this endogeneity concern, I conduct a placebo test using pre-period
election data. In particular, I estimate the following cross-sectional specification
using OLS:
Far-righti,1999−2003 = α + β  ̂Foreigni,2006−2015 + φr + εi (5)
where Far − righti,1999−2003 is the level change (or percentage change)
in Finns Party’s vote share in municipality i between 1999 and 2003, and
 ̂Foreigni,2006−2015 is the level change (or percentage change) in the IV (using
2003 as baseline) in municipality i between 2006 and 2015. The regression also con-
trols for region fixed effects (φr ) and a set of municipality-specific controls measured
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in 2003. Results of the placebo test are presented in Table 6 (cols. 1 and 3). Reas-
suringly, a lack of any statistically significant correlation supports the validity of the
IV’s exclusion restriction.
In columns (2) and (4) of Table 6, I repeat the same placebo analysis, but this
time using the change in Centre Party’s vote share between 1995 and 1999 as my
dependent variable. According to Jaakkola (2000), during this period, voting for
the Centre Party was associated with negative attitudes towards immigrants. The
Centre Party placed as a runner-up in both the 1995 and the 1999 parliamentary elec-
tions, capturing 19.9% and 22.4% of votes, respectively. Reassuringly, the results
from this placebo test (Table 6, cols. 2 and 4) suggest no statistically significant
correlation between the 2006 and 2015 trend in the shift-share instrument and the
1995–1999 trend in the Centre Party’s popularity, further strengthening the validity
of my identification strategy.
The shift-share instrument itself has also been challenged in a recent paper by
Jaeger et al. (2018), who argue that the estimate of the short-run effect of immigra-
tion could be “contaminated” by the long-run general equilibrium effect of previous
immigrant wave(s). Thus, I follow their suggestion and include a 2-year lag of the
share of foreign citizens in the main specification. Both the immigrant share and
its lagged counterpart are instrumented for using the shift-share IV based on 2003
baseline distributions. Results are presented in Table 18. The main IV coefficient
increases in magnitude while also remaining statistically significant at 0.1% level.
Although the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-stat. in the full specification (Table 18, col.
Table 6 Placebo test (OLS)
 Finns Party  Kesk %  Finns Party %  Kesk
(1999–2003) (1995–1999) (1999–2003) (1995–1999)
 IV (2006–2015) 0.106 0.902
(0.214) (0.658)
%  IV (2006–2015) 0.620 −0.108
(0.598) (0.080)
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 297 297 297 297
Adjusted R-squared 0.168 0.111 0.251 0.130
Mean of dep. variable -0.002 0.035 0.511 0.167
 Finns Party (1999–2003), level change in Finns Party’s share of valid votes between 1999 and 2003.
%  Finns Party (1999–2003), percentage change in Finns Party’s share of valid votes between 1999
and 2003.  Kesk (1995–1999), level change in Centre Party’s share of valid votes between 1995 and
1999. %  Kesk (1995–1999), percentage change in Centre Party’s share of valid votes between 1995 and
1999.  IV (2006–2015), level change in the predicted share of foreign citizens between 2006 and 2015.
%  IV (2006–2015), percentage change in the predicted share of foreign citizens between 2006 and
2015. Estimation also includes the following 2003 controls: log of population, population density, share of
females, share of tertiary educated, share of aged 65+, ratio of skilled to unskilled labor, total crime rate,
unemployment rate, median household income. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Data comes from
Statistics Finland’s StatFin database. *** Significant at the 0.1% level. ** Significant at the 1% level. *
Significant at the 5% level. † Significant at the 10% level.
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3) drops to 10.62, the weak instrument-robust Anderson-Rubin chi-sq. test confirms
the statistical significance of the main estimate.
5.4 Direct test of native sorting
As noted earlier, another threat to identification comes from immigrant-induced
native mobility. Different specifications have been suggested to test for it.21 Peri and
Sparber (2011) evaluate each of these specifications using simulated data and find
that some of them have built-in biases. They suggest estimating the following model










+ φi + λt + εi,t (6)
where Ni,t is the number of Finnish citizens in municipality i and election year t ,
and Ni,t−1 is the number of Finnish citizens in i in t − 1 (i.e., 1 calendar year before
t). Similarly, Fi,t and Fi,t−1 refer to the number of foreign citizens in i at t and
t − 1, respectively. Popi,t−1 is the total population in municipality i in t − 1. The
specification also controls for municipality fixed effects (φi) and election year fixed
effects (λt ). The coefficient of interest is β and its interpretation is as follows: β > 0
means there is an attraction between natives and immigrants, while β < 0 suggests a
native outflow in response to the inflow of immigrants. Sá (2014) further points out
that OLS estimation of Eq. 6 will likely lead to an upward bias in the estimate of β,
since unobserved factors that attract immigrants into municipality could also attract
natives. Therefore, I estimate (6) using the same shift-share instrument as before
(with minor adjustments).22 Equation 6 is estimated using both municipality-level
and subregional-level data, where 67 subregions approximate local labor markets.
Results (OLS and IV) are presented in Table 7. Neither of the four coefficients is
statistically significant, suggesting that immigration did not induce native mobility.
Another way to confirm that native sorting does not bias the main IV esti-
mate is to re-estimate (1) using larger geographical units (subregions and regions).
Mainland Finland consists of 18 administrative regions. The required underlying
assumption states that if natives are mobile, they will sort within regions but not
across regions (due to family ties and other costs of moving). Estimation results
are shown in Table 19. All three estimates are negative and statistically significant
at 1%. The regional-level coefficient is smaller in magnitude than its municipality-
level counterpart, but the coefficients are not statistically different from one another.
The subregional-level coefficient, if anything, is larger in magnitude than the
municipality-level estimate. These findings mitigate the concern that native sorting
and spillover effects confound my analysis.
21Among others Borjas (2006), Card (2001, 2009), and Cortes (2008).
22The instrument distributes national net flows of immigrants by continent between t − 1 and t , based on
the 2003 distributions. The predicted net flow of immigrants in i between t − 1 and t is then standardized
by population in t − 1.
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Table 7 Direct test of native mobility
OLS IV OLS IV
Net native flow Net native flow Net native flow Net native flow
(municipality) (municipality) (subregion) (subregion)
Net immigrant flow 0.118 0.709
(municipality) (0.155) (1.104)
Net immigrant flow 0.102 −1.894
(subregion) (0.207) (1.423)
Observations 2,079 2,079 469 469
Mean of dep. variable −0.47% −0.47% −0.45% −0.45%
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-stat. - 18.53 - 14.91
Anderson-Rubin chi-sq. test p val. - 0.521 - 0.117
Net native flow, annual net flow of Finnish citizens (% of population at t − 1). Net immigrant flow, annual
net flow of foreign citizens (% of population at t−1). Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at respective
levels (municipality, subregion). First two columns control for municipality fixed effects and election year
fixed effects, while the last two columns control for subregion fixed effects and election year fixed effects.
Data comes from Statistics Finland’s StatFin database. *** Significant at the 0.1% level. ** Significant at
the 1% level. * Significant at the 5% level. † Significant at the 10% level
5.5 Immigration and voting for other parties
An important aspect of any election study is understanding which parties benefit from
one party’s loss of votes. In the context of my analysis, this means finding out which
parties gained the votes Finns Party lost to immigration. Thus, I re-estimate (1) using
vote share of every main party as the dependent variable (see Section 3.2 for further
description of these parties).23 Table 8 presents the results. As expected, the two
parties that gained votes were the pro-immigration Green League and Swedish Peo-
ple’s Party. Their positive coefficients indeed add up to the size of the Finns Party’s
negative coefficient. Moreover, the relative gains of these two parties were large,
especially for the Swedish People’s Party (57% with respect to the sample mean).
6 Discussion of potential mechanisms
6.1 Immigration, voter turnout, and protest vote
In order to shed some light on the potential mechanisms through which immigration
reduces Finns Party’s support, I first consider the impact of immigration on voter
turnout (share of eligible voters who cast a ballot in an election) and protest vote
(fraction of total ballots that are invalid). As Table 9 shows, foreign municipal in-
migration increased voter turnout although the effect is small (3%). Protest vote was
23Left Alliance is not considered as it did not participate in all elections during the study period.
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Table 8 Immigration and election outcomes (all main parties)
(IV) (IV) (IV) (IV) (IV) (IV) (IV)
Finns Party Vihr SFP/RKP Kok Kesk SDP KD
Share of foreign citizens −3.351*** 1.159*** 2.303* −0.900† 0.645 −1.013 −0.317
(% of population in 2003) (0.936) (0.295) (1.130) (0.527) (0.475) (0.833) (0.251)
Observations 2,079 2,079 2,079 2,079 2,079 2,079 2,079
Mean of dep. variable 12% 5% 4.07% 17.4% 33.4% 17.5% 3.95%
Std. dev. of dep. variable 7.56% 4.36% 13.6% 10% 16.8% 12.6% 3.38%
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-stat. 22.77 22.77 22.77 22.77 22.77 22.77 22.77
Finns Party, Finns Party’s share of valid votes; Vihr, Green League’s share of valid votes; SFP/RKP,
Swedish People’s Party’s share of valid votes; Kok, National Coalition Party’s share of valid votes; Kesk,
Centre Party’s share of valid votes; SDP, Social Democratic Party’s share of valid votes; KD, Chris-
tian Democrats’ share of valid votes. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at municipality level. All
regressions control for municipality fixed effects, election year fixed effects, region-by-election year fixed
effects, and the following municipality-specific time-varying controls (in lagged form): log of popula-
tion, population density, share of females, share of tertiary educated, share of aged 65+, ratio of skilled
to unskilled labor, total crime rate, unemployment rate, median household income. Data comes from
Statistics Finland’s StatFin database. *** Significant at the 0.1% level. ** Significant at the 1% level. *
Significant at the 5% level. † Significant at the 10% level.
not affected. This suggests immigration induced natives’ participation in the election
process, potentially activating anti-far-right voters who would otherwise not vote. It
is also worth noting that the OLS counterparts to all coefficients in both Tables 8
and 9 are attenuated towards zero (see Tables 20 and 21 for comparison), further
suggesting the presence of measurement error in the share of foreign citizens.
Table 9 Immigration and voter turnout, protest vote
(IV) (IV)
Voter turnout Protest vote
Share of foreign citizens 1.711** 0.021
(% of population in 2003) (0.530) (0.025)
Observations 2,079 2,079
Mean of dep. variable 59.7% 0.51%
Std. dev. of dep. variable 15.4% 0.24%
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-stat. 22.77 22.77
Voter turnout, share of eligible voters who cast ballot in election. Protest vote, share of invalid ballots. Stan-
dard errors in parentheses, clustered at municipality level. Both regressions control for municipality fixed
effects, election year fixed effects, region-by-election year fixed effects, and the following municipality-
specific time-varying controls (in lagged form): log of population, population density, share of females,
share of tertiary educated, share of aged 65+, ratio of skilled to unskilled labor, total crime rate, unem-
ployment rate, median household income. Data comes from Statistics Finland’s StatFin database. ***
Significant at the 0.1% level. ** Significant at the 1% level. * Significant at the 5% level. † Significant at
the 10% level.
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6.2 Heterogeneity analysis and intergroup contact theory
Next, I test for the heterogeneity in the effect with respect to various initial conditions.
In particular, first, the sample is split based on the median values of the following ini-
tial conditions: population, population density, immigrant share, Finns Party’s vote
share, share of tertiary educated, skill ratio, median household income, and unem-
ployment rate.24 Then, separately for each initial condition, the share of foreign
citizens is interacted with the above-median/below-median dummies. All regressions
are estimated using the same IV as before. Results are reported in Table 10. The
strong negative effect is present across municipalities regardless of their initial popu-
lation size, density, level of education, skill ratio, median income, and unemployment
rate. The coefficient is remarkably stable across different specifications both in terms
of its magnitude and statistical significance. However, columns (3) and (4) do show
some heterogeneity in the effect, since in both cases, the hypothesis that the two
coefficients are equal can be rejected. Column (4) suggests that municipalities with
higher pre-existing support for the far-right experienced a smaller reduction in anti-
immigrant voting than the municipalities where Finns Party was less popular to begin
with. However, the effect of immigration on high-nationalist municipalities is still
negative and sizable, suggesting that the inflow of immigrants even into the far-right
“strongholds” can ameliorate natives’ attitudes towards foreigners.
The most interesting result of Table 10 is presented in column (3). The negative
effect of immigration on the Finns Party’s vote share is found only in municipali-
ties with high pre-existing immigrant share. In other words, places where natives are
already living side-by-side with immigrants are the ones that experience a reduction
in anti-immigrant voting as a result of further immigrant inflow. This suggests that
previous exposure to immigrants matters, providing some evidence in support of All-
port (1954)’s intergroup contact theory. The importance of sustained contact between
natives and immigrants is further strengthened by the results from an additional het-
eronegeity analysis, in which I split the sample by the 25th and 75th percentiles
(Table 22). The negative effect is only present in the municipalities in the top quartile
of the initial immigrant share (Table 22, col. 3). Interestingly, Table 22 also reveals
that the effect is stronger in most rural places compared to the most urban commu-
nities (col. 2). However, given the weak first stage, this result has to be treated with
caution.
6.3 Welfare-state channel
Last but not least, the welfare-state channel is yet another potential mechanism that
could explain my main finding. There are two possible policy scenarios through
which immigration affects the welfare system of the host country. On the one hand,
migration can lead to changes in tax rates while per capita benefits are kept con-
stant (tax adjustment model). On the other hand, tax rates might remain unchanged
24All (except Finns Party’s vote share) are measured at the beginning of 2004. Finns Party’s vote share
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Table 11 Immigration and municipality tax revenue and spending (2006–2010)
(IV) (IV) (IV) (IV) (IV) (IV)
Total Income Property Corporate Social and Edu. and
tax tax tax tax health care cultural
revenue revenue revenue revenue spending spending
Share of foreign citizens 39.08 56.04† −2.43 −13.91 −11.70 −45.78
(% of population in 2003) (43.74) (33.74) (13.20) (20.06) (142.7) (43.42)
Observations 1,485 1,485 1,485 1,485 1,485 1,485
Mean of dep. variable 2,697.7 2,323.9 163.4 210.4 3,235.5 1,268.5
Std. dev. of dep. variable 527.4 467.5 123.9 134.4 711.6 260.2
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-stat. 21.81 21.81 21.81 21.81 21.81 21.81
Total tax revenue, total municipality tax revenue (EUR per capita); Income tax revenue, municipality per-
sonal income tax revenue (EUR per capita); Property tax revenue, municipality property tax revenue (EUR
per capita); Corporate tax revenue, municipality corporate income tax revenue (EUR per capita); Social
and health care spending, municipality spending on social and health care services (EUR per capita); Edu.
and cultural spending, municipality spending on education and cultural activities (EUR per capita). Stan-
dard errors in parentheses, clustered at municipality level. All regressions control for municipality fixed
effects, election year fixed effects, region-by-election year fixed effects, and the following municipality-
specific time-varying controls (in lagged form): log of population, population density, share of females,
share of tertiary educated, share of aged 65+, ratio of skilled to unskilled labor, unemployment rate, median
household income. Data comes from Statistics Finland’s database titled Economic data reported by munic-
ipalities and joint municipal boards. *** Significant at the 0.1% level. ** Significant at the 1% level. *
Significant at the 5% level. † Significant at the 10% level
while per capita benefits adjust (benefit adjustment model). Under both scenarios,
if immigrants are, on average, net contributors to the system (i.e., their tax contri-
butions exceed the amount of social assistance they receive), both high-skilled and
low-skilled natives will likely benefit from the presence of foreign workers due to
a positive welfare spillover (Facchini and Mayda 2009, 2012). Therefore, an influx
of such immigrants can ameliorate natives’ attitudes towards them, and thus make
natives less supportive of the anti-immigrant Finns Party.
In the absence of any individual-level data on immigrant tax contributions and
social assistance program take-up, I turn to municipality-level data instead. Using
data from 2006–2010 (including non-election years), I consider the effect of immi-
gration on municipal tax revenue and spending.25 The analysis uses the same IV as
the main estimation. I find a small positive effect of municipal in-migration of foreign
citizens on per capita personal income tax revenue (2.5%), although the coefficient is
statistically significant only at 10% (Table 11, column 2). On the other hand, there is
clearly no effect of immigration on per capita property tax revenue or corporate tax
revenue (Table 11, cols. 3 and 4).
The provision of social welfare in Finland is delegated to individual municipalities
(source: Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, 2006). As Hytti and Paananen (2003)
25Data comes from Statistics Finland’s database titled “Economic data reported by municipalities and joint
municipal boards.” Only limited data is available after 2010.
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explain, immigrants with a resident permit valid for at least a year have the same
rights to social security (i.e., unemployment benefits, family benefits linked to child-
birth and child-rearing, and income support) as the native population. As Table 11,
column (5) suggests, immigration had virtually no effect on municipal per capita
spending on social and health care services. In addition, there was no effect of immi-
gration on per capita spending on education and cultural activities. These findings
suggest that an inflow of foreigners into a municipality did not overburden the provi-
sion of social welfare and other public services. Together with the positive effect on
municipal income tax revenue, this suggests that welfare-state channel appears to be
a plausible mechanism explaining the main finding.
7 Conclusion
This paper uses a novel panel dataset to study the effect of immigration on voting for
the far-right Finns Party in Finland. Using an instrumental variable approach based
on previous settlement patterns of immigrants, I show that municipal in-migration
of foreign citizens has a statistically significant and sizable negative effect on Finns
Party’s electoral support in national elections. In particular, a 1 percentage point
increase in the share of foreign citizens in a municipality decreases Finns Party’s
vote share by 3.5 percentage points (28% of the mean). This result—albeit consis-
tent in magnitude with the negative estimates in Steinmayr (2018) and Dustmann
et al. (2019)—runs contrary to most findings in the previous literature. Placebo tests
using pre-period data suggest that the negative effect is not driven by persistent
trends at the municipality level. The votes Finns Party loses due to immigration are
captured by the two pro-immigration parties—the Green League and the Swedish
People’s Party.
To explore the potential mechanisms driving my main finding, I first show that
immigration increases local voter turnout, potentially activating a larger portion of
the pro-immigration base in the municipality. In addition, heterogeneity analysis
reveals that the negative effect of immigration on far-right popularity is present
only in the communities with large initial immigrant share. This provides some evi-
dence in support of Allport (1954)’s intergroup contact theory, which emphasizes the
importance of sustained contact between natives and immigrants in ameliorating the
local anti-immigrant sentiments. Finally, I provide some evidence consistent with the
welfare-state channel as a potential mechanism. In particular, I find that foreign in-
migration increases per capita municipal income tax revenue, while the per capita
spending on social services, health care, and education remain unaffected.
Given the serious nature of the threat far-right parties pose to the European
integration process, Europe’s security (with the ongoing threat from the Russian
Federation), and potentially even the future of liberal democracy itself, the role of
far-right parties in Western societies remains one of the most important topics of the
public debate in Europe today. This paper contributes to the debate by presenting a
unique case study showing that under some conditions, local immigrant inflow can
actually reduce far-right popularity. To better understand the complexity of the rela-
tionship between immigration and far-right voting, future research needs to carefully
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address the interplay between the effects of micro-level and macro-level exposure to
immigrants on far-right votes across the continent.
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Appendix A. Description of municipality-specific time-varying
controls
• Log of total population - to capture demographic dynamics (Barone et al. 2016).
• Population density (inhabitants per km2; proxy for urbanization) - far-right
parties tend to gather larger support among people from rural municipalities.
• Share of women in the adult population - women tend to be less supportive of
the Finns Party (Niemi 2012).
• Share of old people in the adult population (65 and above) - far-right parties
generally score high points among old people (appeal to tradition, conservatism,
etc.).
• Total crime rate (crimes per 100,000 inhabitants) - far-right parties often cam-
paign on issues related to law and order. Higher crime rate might therefore lead
to higher Finns Party’s popularity.
• Unemployment rate - poor economic performance of a municipality reflected in
high unemployment rate is expected to be a strong predictor of far-right support.
• Share of population (25-64) with tertiary education - people with university edu-
cation are less likely to accept nationalist-populist agenda, and therefore are less
likely to vote for the far-right parties.
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• Skill ratio (skilled/unskilled workers) - proxied by the number of people (aged
20 or above) with education levels 2 and 3 divided by the number of people with
education level 1 (Mayda 2006). Level 1 corresponds to ISCED26 categories 0,
1, 2 (i.e., basic education), level 2 to ISCED categories 3, 4 (i.e., completed
upper secondary education), and level 3 to ISCED categories 5–8 (i.e., tertiary
education). Literature suggests that low-skilled workers are more likely to vote
for far-right parties than high-skilled ones.
• Median disposable income of household unit per consumption unit (in EUR) -
controls for differences in standards of living across municipalities. Municipal-
ities with higher income level should be less prone to vote for the Finns Party.
There are two drawbacks with this variable: first, it is not adjusted for the varia-
tion in price levels across municipalities. Second, according to Statistics Finland,
due to revisions in income concepts, 1995–2009 and 2010–2014 data are not
fully comparable. Nevertheless, since municipality-level GDP data is not avail-
able, median disposable income together with the unemployment rate are the best
economic measures on the municipality level that I have available.
B Robustness checks and further results
Table 12 Main IV – first stage estimates
(1) (2) (3)
Share of foreign Share of foreign Share of foreign
citizens citizens citizens
Predicted share of foreign citizens 0.943*** 0.653*** 0.555***
(% of population in 2003) (0.120) (0.111) (0.116)
Municipality/election year FE Yes Yes Yes
Time-varying controls (lag) Yes Yes
Region FE × election year FE Yes
Observations 2,079 2,079 2,079
Mean of dep. variable 1.46% 1.46% 1.46%
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-stat. 62.32 34.53 22.77
Stock-Yogo weak ID test (10% max. IV size c.v.) 16.38 16.38 16.38
Share of foreign citizens, share of foreign citizens (% of population in 2003). Standard errors in parenthe-
ses, clustered at municipality level. Time-varying controls: log of population, population density, share of
females, share of tertiary educated, share of aged 65+, ratio of skilled to unskilled labor, total crime rate,
unemployment rate, median household income. Data comes from Statistics Finland’s StatFin database.
*** Significant at the 0.1% level. ** Significant at the 1% level. * Significant at the 5% level. † Significant
at the 10% level
26UNESCO’s International Standard Classification of Education.
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Table 13 Main IV estimates with varying covariates
(IV) (IV) (IV) (IV) (IV) (IV)
Finns Finns Finns Finns Finns Finns
Party Party Party Party Party Party
Share of foreign citizens −1.464***−1.547***−2.357***−4.031***−4.103***−3.351***
(% of population in 2003) (0.373) (0.388) (0.512) (0.817) (0.809) (0.936)
Municipality/election year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Population density (1-year lag) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Female share (1-year lag) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Share aged 65+ (1-year lag) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Share tertiary educated (1-year lag) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log of population (1-year lag) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Skill ratio (1-year lag) Yes Yes Yes
Total crime rate (1-year lag) Yes Yes Yes
Unemployment rate (1-year lag) Yes Yes
Median household income (1-year lag) Yes Yes
Region FE x election year FE Yes
Observations 2,079 2,079 2,079 2,079 2,079 2,079
Mean of dep. variable 12% 12% 12% 12% 12% 12%
Std. dev. of dep. variable 7.56% 7.56% 7.56% 7.56% 7.56% 7.56%
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-stat. 62.32 74.98 52.93 34.64 34.53 22.77
Finns Party, Finns Party’s share of valid votes. Population density, # of inhabitants per kn2; Female share,
% of women in the adult population; Share aged 65+, % of people aged 65+ in the adult population;
Share tertiary educated, % of population ages 25-64 with tertiary education; Log of population, log of
total population; Skill ratio, ratio of skilled to unskilled workers (among those aged 20+); Total crime rate,
# of crimes per 100,000 inhabitants; Unemployment rate, # of unemployed (as % of labor force); Median
household income, median household disposable income per consumption unit (in EUR). Standard errors
in parentheses, clustered at municipality level. Data comes from Statistics Finland’s StatFin database. ***
Significant at the 0.1% level. ** Significant at the 1% level. * Significant at the 5% level. † Significant at
the 10% level
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Table 14 IV results using 1991 as base year (second stage)
(1) (2) (3)
Finns Party Finns Party Finns Party
Share of foreign citizens −2.379*** −5.707*** −5.026*
(% of population in 1991) (0.544) (1.445) (2.093)
Municipality/election year FE Yes Yes Yes
Time-varying controls (lag) Yes Yes
Region FE × election year FE Yes
Observations 2,079 2,079 2,079
Mean of dep. variable 12% 12% 12%
Std. dev. of dep. variable 7.56% 7.56% 7.56%
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-stat. 32.65 14.81 6.51
Anderson-Rubin chi-sq. test p val. 0.000
Finns Party, Finns Party’s share of valid votes. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at municipality
level. Time-varying controls: log of population, population density, share of females, share of tertiary
educated, share of aged 65+, ratio of skilled to unskilled labor, total crime rate, unemployment rate, median
household income. Data comes from Statistics Finland’s StatFin database. *** Significant at the 0.1%
level. ** Significant at the 1% level. * Significant at the 5% level. † Significant at the 10% level
Table 15 Exclusion of 2009 and 2014 European elections (IV results)
(1) (2) (3)
Finns Party Finns Party Finns Party
Share of foreign citizens −1.802*** −4.365*** −3.954***
(% of population in 2003) (0.424) (0.879) (1.126)
Municipality/election year FE Yes Yes Yes
Time-varying controls (lag) Yes Yes
Region FE × election year FE Yes
Observations 1,485 1,485 1,485
Mean of dep. variable 11.9% 11.9% 11.9%
Std. dev. of dep. variable 8.53% 8.53% 8.53%
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-stat. 62.50 33.60 22.06
Finns Party, Finns Party’s share of valid votes. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at municipality
level. Time-varying controls: log of population, population density, share of females, share of tertiary
educated, share of aged 65+, ratio of skilled to unskilled labor, total crime rate, unemployment rate, median
household income. Data comes from Statistics Finland’s StatFin database. *** Significant at the 0.1%
level. ** Significant at the 1% level. * Significant at the 5% level. † Significant at the 10% level
Checking for outliers: exclusion of 9 largest Finnish municipalities
To check if outliers are not driving the main results, I exclude 9 largest municipalities
from the analysis. These municipalities are the only ones with population of 100,000
or more during the 2006–2015 period. The following municipalities are omitted:
Helsinki, Espoo, Tampere, Vantaa, Turku, Oulu, Jyväskylä, Lahti, and Kuopio. With
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Table 16 9 largest municipalities omitted (IV results)
(1) (2) (3)
Finns Party Finns Party Finns Party
Share of foreign citizens −1.889*** −5.001*** −4.975*
(% of population in 2003) (0.564) (1.136) (2.180)
Municipality/election year FE Yes Yes Yes
Time-varying controls (lag) Yes Yes
Region FE × election year FE Yes
Observations 2,016 2,016 2,016
Mean of dep. variable 12.1% 12.1% 12.1%
Std. dev. of dep. variable 7.6% 7.6% 7.6%
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-stat. 46.34 23.78 10.74
Anderson-Rubin chi-sq. test p val. 0.003
Finns Party, Finns Party’s share of valid votes. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at municipality
level. Time-varying controls: log of population, population density, share of females, share of tertiary
educated, share of aged 65+, ratio of skilled to unskilled labor, total crime rate, unemployment rate, median
household income. Data comes from Statistics Finland’s StatFin database. *** Significant at the 0.1%
level. ** Significant at the 1% level. * Significant at the 5% level. † Significant at the 10% level
the exception of Oulu (which is in central Finland), all of them are located in the
southern part of the country. Results are presented in Table 16. Overall, the analysis
suggests that outliers do not drive the main IV estimates.
Table 17 Separate IV analysis by election type
(IV) (IV) (IV)
Finns Party Finns Party Finns Party
(parliamentary) (presidential) (European)
Share of foreign citizens −3.941** −2.963** −2.236**
(% of population in 2003) (1.204) (0.740) (0.845)
Observations 891 594 594
Mean of dep. variable 14.9% 7.33% 12.3%
Std. dev. of dep. variable 9.31% 4.21% 4.23%
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-stat. 20.40 21.70 18.92
Finns Party, Finns Party’s share of valid votes. First column uses data from parliamentary elections in
2007, 2011, 2015; second column uses data from presidential elections in 2006, 2012; third column uses
data from European parliamentary elections in 2009 and 2014. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered
at municipality level. All regressions control for municipality fixed effects, election year fixed effects,
region-by-election year fixed effects, and the following municipality-specific time-varying controls (in
lagged form): log of population, population density, share of females, share of tertiary educated, share
of aged 65+, ratio of skilled to unskilled labor, total crime rate, unemployment rate, median household
income. Data comes from Statistics Finland’s StatFin database. *** Significant at the 0.1% level. **
Significant at the 1% level. * Significant at the 5% level. † Significant at the 10% level
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Table 18 Controlling for lagged share of foreign citizens
(IV) (IV) (IV)
Finns Party Finns Party Finns Party
Share of foreign citizens −8.893*** −9.296*** −7.131***
(% of population in 2003) (1.883) (2.169) (2.061)
Share of foreign citizens (2-year lag) Yes Yes Yes
(% of population in 2003)
Municipality/election year FE Yes Yes Yes
Time-varying controls (lag) Yes Yes
Region FE × election year FE Yes
Observations 2,079 2,079 2,079
Mean of dep. variable 12% 12% 12%
Std. dev. of dep. variable 7.56% 7.56% 7.56%
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-stat. 12.01 12.19 10.62
Anderson-Rubin chi-sq. test p val. 0.000 0.000 0.000
Finns Party, Finns Party’s share of valid votes. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at municipality
level. Time-varying controls: log of population, population density, share of females, share of tertiary
educated, share of aged 65+, ratio of skilled to unskilled labor, total crime rate, unemployment rate, median
household income. Data comes from Statistics Finland’s StatFin database. *** Significant at the 0.1%
level. ** Significant at the 1% level. * Significant at the 5% level. † Significant at the 10% level
Table 19 IV sensitivity to native sorting
(IV) (IV) (IV)
Finns Party Finns Party Finns Party
(municipality) (subregion) (region)
Share of foreign citizens (% of population in 2003) −1.820***
(0.285)
Share of foreign citizens (% of population in 2003) −2.619***
(0.542)
Share of foreign citizens (% of population in 2003) −1.428**
(0.351)
Observations 2,079 469 126
Mean of dep. variable 12% 11.7% 11.7%
Standard deviation of dep. variable 7.56%. 6.95% 6.49%
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-stat. 97.71 40.08 60.61
Finns Party, Finns Party’s share of valid votes. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at respective levels
(municipality, subregion, region). All regressions control for election year fixed effects, and the following
municipality/subregion/region-specific time-varying controls (in lagged form): log of population, popula-
tion density, share of females, share of tertiary educated, share of aged 65+, ratio of skilled to unskilled
labor, total crime rate, unemployment rate, median household income. Data comes from Statistics Fin-
land’s StatFin database. *** Significant at the 0.1% level. ** Significant at the 1% level. * Significant at
the 5% level. † Significant at the 10% level
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Table 20 Immigration and election outcomes (all main parties): OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Finns Party Vihr SFP/RKP Kok Kesk SDP KD
Share of foreign citizens −0.656* 0.147 0.746* −0.208 0.235 −0.162 −0.074
(% of population in 2003) (0.303) (0.094) (0.333) (0.160) (0.224) (0.224) (0.110)
Observations 2,079 2,079 2,079 2,079 2,079 2,079 2,079
Adjusted R-squared 0.880 0.881 0.637 0.881 0.598 0.939 0.513
Mean of dep. variable 12% 5% 4.07% 17.4% 33.4% 17.5% 3.95%
Std. dev. of dep. variable 7.56% 4.36% 13.6% 10% 16.8% 12.6% 3.38%
Finns Party, Finns Party’s share of valid votes; Vihr, Green League’s share of valid votes; SFP/RKP,
Swedish People’s Party’s share of valid votes; Kok, National Coalition Party’s share of valid votes; Kesk,
Centre Party’s share of valid votes; SDP, Social Democratic Party’s share of valid votes; KD, Chris-
tian Democrats’ share of valid votes. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at municipality level. All
regressions control for municipality fixed effects, election year fixed effects, region-by-election year fixed
effects, and the following municipality-specific time-varying controls (in lagged form): log of popula-
tion, population density, share of females, share of tertiary educated, share of aged 65+, ratio of skilled
to unskilled labor, total crime rate, unemployment rate, median household income. Data comes from
Statistics Finland’s StatFin database. *** Significant at the 0.1% level. ** Significant at the 1% level. *
Significant at the 5% level. † Significant at the 10% level
Table 21 Immigration and voter turnout, protest vote: OLS
(1) (2)
Voter turnout Protest vote
Share of foreign citizens 0.369* 0.005
(% of population in 2003) (0.154) (0.012)
Observations 2,079 2,079
Adjusted R-squared 0.985 0.453
Mean of dep. variable 59.7% 0.51%
Std. dev. of dep. variable 15.4% 0.24%
Voter turnout, share of eligible voters who cast ballot in election. Protest vote, share of invalid ballots. Stan-
dard errors in parentheses, clustered at municipality level. Both regressions control for municipality fixed
effects, election year fixed effects, region-by-election year fixed effects, and the following municipality-
specific time-varying controls (in lagged form): log of population, population density, share of females,
share of tertiary educated, share of aged 65+, ratio of skilled to unskilled labor, total crime rate, unem-
ployment rate, median household income. Data comes from Statistics Finland’s StatFin database. ***
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